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ABSTRACT 
Designing Multi-Target Salesforce Incentive Contract 
by 
HUANG Wenxin 
Master of Philosophy 
Multi-target incentive contracts are widely observed in practice to stimulate 
salesforce effort. However, little is known about their effectiveness and the issues 
involved in designing them. In this thesis, we investigate the incentive contracting 
problem between a manufacturer and an agent when the realized sales of a product 
are affected by both the agent's selling effort and the type of the agent. The agent's 
type is uncertain to the manufacturer, whereas the agent can observe the actual type 
when exerting her selling effort. Again, this is unobservable by the manufacturer. For 
contract design problem, we develop a principal-agent model with both moral hazard 
and adverse selection. We examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter 
decisions employing a single multi-target contract for the agent who can be of 
different types. Because menu contracts are commonly studied in literature for the 
adverse selection problem, we also study a menu of single-target contracts; and 
examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter decisions. We then compare 
the performance between the two types of contract. We arrive at a number of 
managerial insights regarding the design and the performance of multi-target contract 
and menu contract. 
 
Keywords: Principal-agent model, moral hazard, adverse selection, multi-target 
contract, menu contract  
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1 Introduction
Manufacturers usually rely on their salesforce to sell products, resulting in a
principal-agent relationship in which the manufacturer is the principal and the
salesforce is the agent. The agent can exert an e¤ort to improve the sales level,
but because the e¤ort level is generally not observable to the manufacturer, a
salesforce incentive scheme is needed to motivate the agents e¤ort. Contracting
problems with hidden actions are regarded as moral hazard: the principal can
observe the outcome of the agents e¤ort, but cannot infer the e¤ort level of the
agent. Very often, as the agent is closer to the market than the manufacturer, she
possesses better information about the market for the product. Such information
will inuence the sales and the compensation to the agent. The selling capability
of the agent can also a¤ect the realized sales. Its easier for an agent with a
higher selling capability to achieve a high sales volume, and it requires a higher
sales e¤ort level for the low capability agent to reach an identical sales volume.
The agents capability is also often not observable to the manufacturer. The
asymmetric information advantage of the agent over the manufacturer is denoted
as the adverse selection problem in principal-agent theory. For convenience, we
say that the agent is of a high type if the market condition or her selling capability
is high, and of a low type otherwise. A large/small sales volume can result from
a high/low e¤ort level of the agent or a high/low type or both; for example, the
iPhone sells well in the market even if the agent exerts little e¤ort.
An e¤ective salesforce compensation plan should consider both the e¤ort level
and the agents type, and provide an appropriate incentive to the agent to sell a
product. As quota-based contracts are widely employed in practice for salesforce
compensation, we investigate the design of such contracts in the presence of both
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
In the literature, a menu of contracts is the most common solution to an
adverse selection problem. It is designed such that the agent chooses one of con-
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tracts in the menu based on her private information about the product. The use
of the menu contract is to reveal an agents private information, which can benet
the manufacturer by measuring the agents selling e¤ort more accurately. Menus
of quota-based contracts have been extensively studied for salesforce incentives.
The contract parameters should be carefully chosen to make sure that its in the
agents interest to truthfully reveal her private information and to exert an e¤ort
at the optimal level. However, it is never easy to design such a contract that
exploits the agents private information and induces her e¤ort level simultane-
ously, and its critical to set reasonable sales quotas that reect a products sales
prospect and to measure the agents performance.
Although menus of quota-based contracts have been extensively studied in
literature, their use in practice is limited. In contrast, multi-target contracts are
widely applied by practitioners in a variety of industries, for example, the o¢ ce
equipment industry (Xeroxs partnership program 2015), automobile industry
(Automotive News 2012 and Crains Detroit Business 2013), pharmaceutical in-
dustry (Sinha, Prabhakant and Zoltners 2001), and so on.
In this thesis, we investigate a menu of single-target contracts and a dual-
target contract and ask the following two questions: How is the performance of
the widely applied multi-target contract compared with the well-studied menu
contract? And when can a multi-target contract outperform a menu contract?
To address the above questions and ll the gap between practice and literature,
we consider a principal-agent problem in which a risk-neutral agent with limited
liability sells a product for a manufacturer. The realized sales are a¤ected by
the agents selling e¤ort and the agent type, both of which are the agents pri-
vate information that are unobservable to the manufacturer. The agent type is
uncertain and can be either high or low. Although the manufacturer knows the
probability for each type to occur, the agent knows precisely the type value when
she exerts an e¤ort to sell the product.
2
After describing the model setting in detail, we proceed to introduce two con-
tractual forms: a menu of single-target contracts and a dual-target contract. We
formulate the manufacturers problem and the agents optimal response under
each contract. Due to the complexity of the manufacturers problem, its in-
tractable to obtain a closed-form solution for the manufacturers problem. Con-
sequently, we conduct a numerical analysis for each contract and nd out the
manufacturers optimal contract parameters and expected prot as well as the
optimal e¤ort level and the maximum expected prot of each type of agent. Fur-
thermore, we compare the manufacturers expected prots, the total expected
sales and the agents expected prots under the two types of contracts. Our
comparison indicates that the manufacturers choice of contract is a¤ected by the
probability of the high type and the di¤erence between the values of the low and
high types.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature,
and in Section 3 we present the models of the menu contract and the dual-target
contract, respectively. In Section 4, we conduct a numerical analysis for the menu
contract and the dual-target contract, and draw some managerial insights about
the relative performance of the two contracts, the manufacturers optimal choice
of contract type, and the optimal parameter values for each type of contract. In
Section 5 we discuss some possible future work. Then we conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
This thesis is related to three steams of literature, including marketing, economics
and operations management.
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2.1 Marketing Literature
The salesforce incentive compensation problem has been extensively studied in
the marketing literature. Coughlan (1993) provided a comprehensive review,
including model assumptions such as a random demand function, i.e., the realized
sales generated by a selling e¤ort involves a random noise term.
Two widely applied simple contractual forms have been examined, the com-
mission contract and the bonus contract. Commission is a compensation method
in which agents are paid based on a percentage of the realized sales. Compen-
sation schemes in which commission payment is involved are believed to be the
most e¢ cient and the most e¤ective contractual forms because the sales volume
is nancially rewarded with accuracy.
The bonus contract is a compensation method in which the agent will receive
a bonus when the realized sales meet or exceed a pre-specied quota. This com-
pensation scheme is the most appealing to security oriented (risk-averse) agent
rather than achievement oriented (risk-neutral or even risk-prone) ones, and is
easy to manage. The major limitation of this type of compensation scheme is
that it provides no further incentive for the agent when the sales volume reaches
the quota (Tosdal 1953).
As reported by Peck (1982), about 18% of salesforces were compensated by
salary only, 9% were merely compensated by commissions and 73% were paid
through a combination of base salary and performance-based payment. A com-
pensation scheme combining base salary and incentive pay is superior to base
salary or incentive payment only and prevents most of the limitations of either
one of the two schemes.
Basu et al. (1985) proposed a BLSS model for a moral-hazard problem in
which the rm is not capable of inferring the e¤ort exerted by the agent by
merely observing her performance (i.e., sales volume). The agent is risk averse,
which is represented by a power-utility function. Under such a model setting,
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Basu et al. (1985) proved the optimality of nonlinear shapes of the optimal
compensation scheme. The BLSS model has been widely used to derive general
recommendations with respect to the form of compensation plan.
Sinha, Prabhakant and Zoltners (2001) summarized the managerial insights
that are found in literature and showed that compensation schemes combining a
base salary and some incentives (such as commissions or bonuses) are a common
method to compensate the agent.
A number of publications studied both moral hazard and adverse selection
problems. Lal and Staelin (1986) considered the design of compensation schemes
for heterogeneous and risk-averse salesforce and demonstrated the rationality of
the menu contracts. Despite how appealing the nonlinearity of the optimal con-
tracts in the BLSS plan is, in practice, its intricate to implement, since the
manufacturer has to specify a structure of commission rates and sales quotas.
Under general assumptions on the agents utility function, the probability den-
sity function of sales, the agents e¤ort disutility function, linearity of the sales
with respect to the agents e¤ort, Lal and Staelin (1986) relaxed the assumption
of homogeneous salesforce and showed that contracts proposed in the BLSS model
are not always optimal and provided plausible explanations for multitarget con-
tracts. Lal and Staelin (1986) found that applying an optimal compensation
scheme would require the manufacturer to exclude his low skill agents. In com-
parison with the piecewise-linear-threshold contracts, among all the contractual
forms, only linear contracts need to be considered under circumstances in which
cumulative sales outcome is only updated periodically given that the agents util-
ity function is exponential. On the other hand, if the agent has a power utility
function, the piecewise-linear-threshold contract signicantly dominates the best
linear contract.
The subsequent study by Lal and Srinivasan (1993) revealed that simple com-
mission and bonus contracts still outperform other contractual forms even in a
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multi-product and multi-period setting. Raju and Srinivasan (1996) extended
the study of this specic model setting to the multi-territory salesforce situa-
tion. Its striking that both the non-optimality incurred by contract shape and
salesforce heterogeneity is very small with the total non-optimality within the
range of 1%. Raju and Srinivasan (1996) showed that merely varying the quota
(without changing the base salary and/or commission rate) captures most of the
heterogeneity across salespersons/territories.
Even when the non-linear compensations are proved to be optimal, there
are reasons for adopting simpler plans. Plans with a xed salary and a constant
commission rate are simple to administer, easy to understand by agents, and very
often not far from optimality. Even better are plans with a salary and a bonus for
exceeding a certain sales quota, since these plans preserve the non-linear shape
of the BLSS model. Basu and Kalyanaram (1990) compared the performance of
linear compensation scheme with the performance of the BLSS model when the
salespersons utility function denes her to be risk averse. Basu and Kalyanaram
(1990) proved that when the agents risk aversion is high, the linear compensation
plan is almost as protable as the BLSS plan, and theoretically justied the
widespread use of the linear compensation scheme in practice. On the other hand,
when the agent is less risk-averse, a non-linear compensation plan contingent on
performance signicantly outperforms the linear ones.
Bako and Kalecz (2013) showed that when randomness exists in the realized
sales, how the quotas are set a¤ects the behavior of the agent. This quota setting
consequently increases the manufacturers revenue in comparison to single linear
(commission) contracts. Their work further indicates that the quotas should be
set to target either all or the less-e¢ cient (low-type) agents. When the agents
type values are signicantly diversied or the realized sales are highly inuenced
by randomness, its in the agents interest to place higher bonus. Besides, Bako
and Kalecz (2013) also proved that the higher the variability between the values
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of the two agent types, the lower the optimal quotas should be set. Bako and
Kalecz (2013) further demonstrated the importance to preserve the general shape
of the BLSS plan. The quota-based commission plan preserves the convexity of
the BLSS plan and leads to near-optimal results, while the linear plan does not.
Rao (1990) proved the optimality of a menu of single-target contracts for
heterogeneous but risk-neutral agent. In the proposed compensation scheme, the
agent is o¤ered a menu of contracts to choose from, and her choice truthfully
reveals her information. The proposed scheme is continuous, non-linear, and it
provides the agent an immediate payment (bonus) for meeting the quota plus a
constant commission rate.
2.2 Economics Literature
In the economics literature, the basic moral hazard problem was studied by Hol-
strom (1987) and (1991). Principal-agent models have been used to investigate
the quota-based incentive contracts. This stream of literature focuses on a model
setting with a risk-neutral agent whose liability is limited. If both the principal
and the agent are risk-neutral, a bunch of contracts, including quota-based bonus
contract, are optimal. But when the agents liability is limited, Kim (1997), Park
(1995) and Oyer (2000) proved that the quota-based bonus contract is uniquely
optimal. Kim (1997) demonstrated the optimality of a bonus contract in which
the revenue from the product sales is shared by the manufacturer and the agent,
and the agent takes a lump-sum bonus only when the realized sales exceed a pre-
determined sales quota. Park (1995) proved the e¤ectiveness of a performance-
based bonus contract in achieving the rst-best outcome when limited-liability
constraint restrains alternative simple contracts from being applicable. In Oyer
(2000), an additive form of e¤ort-demand relationship was adopted. When the
hazard rate in the demand distribution is monotonically increasing and the agents
participation is only constrained by the limited liability constraint, a quota-based
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bonus contract is more preferable than other alternative compensation schemes.
2.3 Operations Management Literature
The operations management literature often incorporates inventory consideration
in salesforce incentive design. Chu and Lai (2013) found that under demand cen-
sorship and quota-based bonus contract, although the rst-best solution cannot
be achieved, the e¤ectiveness of quota-based bonus contract was proved to ap-
proach the rst-best solution. In the case of additive demande¤ort relationship,
its optimal for a manufacturer to induce a sales e¤ort level and to build an in-
ventory level both greater than the corresponding levels in the rst-best solution.
For the manufacturer in the case of multiplicative demande¤ort relationship, it
is optimal to induce an e¤ort level no higher than the rst-best e¤ort level, but
maintain an inventory level higher than the rst-best solution. Combining the
moral hazard problem, the adverse selection problem, and the inventory consid-
eration, Chen (2005) showed that a menu of linear contracts dominates Gonik
(1978)s forecast-based compensation scheme since Goniks solution was not ca-
pable of motivating di¤erent levels of e¤ort by separating di¤erent agent types
apart.
Chen and Miller (2009) proved that the optimal compensation scheme is a
non-decreasing piecewise linear function which is neither convex nor concave.
Their work indicates that the piecewise-linear-threshold contract is signicantly
superior to the best linear contract when the agent has a power utility function.
Dai and Jerath (2013) found that quota plans can be optimal when inventory con-
straint is considered, although Dai and Jerath (2013) ignored the phenomenon
that the manufacturer is biased to build a higher inventory level than that in the
rst best solution. Chen (2000) showed that the agents contractual form makes
a critical impact on how she is going to put selling e¤ort, which subsequently
determines the manufacturers sales outcome, and eventually how the manufac-
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turer operates his inventory. Furthermore, Chen (2000) proved that it benets
the manufacturer to motivate the agents selling e¤ort in a way that the realized
sales just meet the inventory capacity.
Incentive compensation has been studied with the involvement of innovative
contract forms in a dynamic setting. A typical incentive structure in a multi-
period setting is the stair-step incentive compensation scheme widely applied in
the automobile industry. Under such an incentive scheme, the agent is paid on
di¤erent per-unit commissions when the realized sales exceed di¤erent thresholds;
a base salary might be o¤ered as well (Sohoni et al. 2006). Sohoni et al. (2010)
proved that if the manufacturer associates a positive cost with the sales variance,
a threshold-based incentive with a positive bonus is superior to other schemes
without a bonus o¤ering. Sohoni et al. (2010) showed that an exclusive dealership
with a threshold contract boosts sales quantity and decreases sales variance at the
same time. But non-exclusive dealership with a threshold-based compensation
increases sales variance and decreases sales. In such a dynamic setting, the stair-
step salesforce incentive provides an intrinsic incentive to the dealer to exert a
large e¤ort at the last period in order to boost the sales and meet the threshold.
For this phenomenon, Sohoni et al. (2011) compared an additional marginal pay
(commission) with a threshold-based bonus contract and showed that in the case
of an exclusive dealership, the bonus contract not only boosts the expected sales
but also decreases the sales variance. In the case of a non-exclusive dealership, a
commission contract substantially increases the sales variance. Besides, the bonus
contract continues to outperform the commission contract in this case. Moreover,
Sohoni et al. (2011) proved that the parameters of the incentive compensation
scheme and the demand uncertainty a¤ect the agents optimal e¤ort level decision.
Setting up appropriate threshold parameters reduces the sales variance.
Unlike the above publications, in this thesis, we investigate a multi-target
contract for the salesforce incentive problem with both moral hazard and adverse
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selection. The realized sales are random in the agents e¤ort level. Both the
manufacturer and the agent are risk neutral, and the agent has limited liability.
In addition, we consider a static setting without inventory decision.
For an incentive problem with both moral hazard and adverse selection, in the
literature, menu contracts are a common solution to reveal an agents private in-
formation and induce her selling e¤ort. For the problem with only moral hazard,
Basu et al. (1985) proved that the performance of the single-target contract is
very close to the optimal nonlinear contract, and the e¢ ciency loss of the single-
target contract is within 1%; as shown by Kim (1997), Park (1995) and Oyer
(2000), a single-target contract with a bonus will su¢ ce in motivating the agent
to exert selling e¤ort. As we discussed in Section 1, the multi-target contract is
widely applied in practice for salesforce incentive. If the multi-target contract is
designed only to solve the moral hazard problem, then as the above publications
have found, even a single-target contract would be su¢ cient. Therefore its im-
portant to investigate whether the multi-target contract plays dual roles, one is
to motivate the agent to exert selling e¤ort, and the other is to reveal her private
information.
3 Model
A risk-neutral manufacturer (he) sells a product through a risk-neutral agent
(she) into a market. We focus on a single selling season. The realized demand,
X, is jointly determined by the agents selling e¤ort a, a base demand d, the
agents type , and a random market noise ", as shown in the following equation:
X =  (a+ d) + ".
The multiplicative demande¤ort relationship follows the typical principal-
agent model in the literature (see, e.g., Rao 1990, Petruzzi and Dada 1999,
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Agrawal and Seshadri 2000, Chen 2000, Chen 2005, Chen and Xiao 2009, and
Chu and Lai 2013).
The agent type can take the value of H or L with the probability Pr( =
H) =  and Pr( = L) = 1  , where 0 <  < 1 and H > L > 0. We denote
that the agent is of the high type when her type value is H , and of the low type if
her type value is L. The manufacturer knows only the distribution of the agent
type, while the agent knows the exact value of her type. Before the manufacturer
determines the compensation contract parameters, the distribution of X is known
to both parties. The manufacturer o¤ers the salesforce compensation contract to
the agent, who then decides how much selling e¤ort to exert given her information
about the type.
The random market noise follows a normal distribution "  N (0; 2), and
the realized demand given the agents e¤ort level a and her type value  follows
a normal distribution with the cumulative distribution function F (X j a; ) and
the probability density function f (X j a; ). We assume d > 3 to exclude the
situation in which the expected sales go to negative.
The sequence of events is as follows: The manufacturer o¤ers an incentive
contract T () to the agent; the agent decides whether or not to accept the contract
based on her information of ; upon the selling season begins, the agent makes the
e¤ort level decision a; both the manufacturer and the agent observe the realized
sales X; and the agent is compensated based on X according to the incentive
contract.
Applying principal-agent theory, we analyze the model setting under which
the problem faced by the manufacturer is a combination of adverse selection
(preliminary private information of type value) and moral hazard (e¤ort decision
alongside with the revelation of market demand information). Typically, the man-
ufacturer develops an incentive contract prior to the actual beginning of selling
season. Consider the agents decision when o¤ered an incentive contract. Initially
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she would consider the expected prot if she participates in the contract. Assume
that T () is the contract o¤ered, therefore T (x) is the compensation paid to the
agent if the realized sales are x. The optimal e¤ort level not only depends on the
o¤ered contract, but also on the agents type value. The asymmetric information
advantage permits the agent to make her e¤ort level decision in accordance with
her private information. Suppose a(T () ; ) is the optimal e¤ort level given the
compensation contract T () and the actual agent type . Assume that given the
contract T () and the agents type , U (T () ; ) is the maximum expected prot
achievable for the agent. If U (T () ; ) is less than U0, the agents reservation
prot which represents the expected prot that the agent would achieve from
her external opportunities, then optimization of the e¤ort level is meaningless
towards the agent. Without further specication, we normalize the reservation
prot U0 to zero.
Let m be the prot margin of the product. Combining moral-hazard problem
with adverse selection problem, we follow the typical principal-agent model, which
serves as the basic model for understanding the contract designing issues that are
involved in a salesforce incentive context. Thereby, the margin m is xed and
does not alter with the volume of sales or selling e¤ort.
We assume that the agent is risk-neutral and has only limited wealth, thereby,
she can only receive non-negative payment for any possible sales outcome and that
the base salary  should be non-negative. Note this constraint follows the typical
principal-agent model as the limited-liability constraint in extant publications
(e.g. Sappington 1983, Park 1995, Kim 1997, Oyer 2000, and Poblete 2012).
As its costly for the agent to exert selling e¤ort, the e¤ort cost is assumed to
be quadratic: V (a) = a2=2, an increasing and convex function (e.g. Baker 1992,
Bester and Guth 1998, Schaefer 1998, Chen 2005, Chen and Xiao 2009, and Chu
and Lai 2013). Other e¤ort cost functions could be applied without fundamentally
changing the analytical outcome (Chen 2005). The agents expected prot is
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the payment received from the manufacturer minus the e¤ort cost. In order to
maximize the expected prot achievable under the compensation scheme T (),
the agent determines the optimal e¤ort level by solving:
max
a
E (T (X)  V (a) j ) .
Notice that the agent assesses the contract based on her information of the
type value. Thus, the agents expected prot is based on her type value  with
respect to the random market noise . The optimal e¤ort level given the contract
T (X) and the agents type is thereby a (T (X) ; ).
Turning to the manufacturers problem, the manufacturers expected prot
is the revenue of the product sales minus the payment to the agent. In order
to maximize the expected prot by optimizing the compensation scheme, the
manufacturers problem could be formulated as:
maxT (x) E (mX   T (X) j )
s:t:
(LL) : T (X)  0,
(IC) : a = a (T (X) ; ) ,
(IR) : U (T (X) ; )  0.
The rst constraint is the limited liability (LL) constraint, ensuring that the
agent receives only non-negative payment for any sales realization, which denotes
that the agent is restricted from taking risks (without penalty). The second con-
straint is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, indicating that the e¤ort
level for each agent type is indeed optimal for the agent (thus compatible with
the agents objective). The last constraint is the individual rationality (IR) con-
straint, indicating that the agent, regardless of her type, is better o¤participating
compared to her outside opportunities.
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3.1 Menu of Single-target Contracts
The agent privately and truly knows the type value while the manufacturer only
knows the distribution of the agent type. In the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation about the agents type, the agent might not truthfully reveal her type to
gain an advantage. According to principal-agent theory, the manufacturer can
reveal the agents type by applying a menu of contracts.
Hence, the manufacturer designs a menu of two single-target contracts for
two di¤erent types of agents, taking the agents incentive into consideration.
Under the menu of single-target contracts, the incentive payment is contingent
on the realized sales. We mainly consider the scenario in which the manufacturer
provides two single-target contracts to the agent, who chooses one given her
information of the type value. By observing the agents choice, the manufacturer
reveals the agents type. Specically, the agent would receive commission when
and only when the realized sales reach or surpass the sales quota q. The contract
form is as follows:
Ti (x) =
8><>: i; xi  qi;i + i (xi   qi) ; xi > qi,
where i = H or L, and TH (x) being the contract intended for the high-type
agent, and TL (x) for the low-type, with i  0.
Note that achieving system e¢ ciency does not mean that theres no informa-
tion rent. Although the low-type agents individual rationality (IR) constraint
would be kept binding (which would be veried below in Section 4), the high-type
agent would obtain a premium as an information rent.
Assuming the agent is of type i, and we try to nd her optimal e¤ort level
decision under the single-target contract. Notice that the agents expected prot
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is:
iS (a) = E (Ti (x) j a; i) 
1
2
a2
= i + i [(a+ d) i   qi] F (qi   (a+ d) i)
+if (qi   (a+ d) i)  1
2
a2. (1)
Maximizing the agents expected prot with respect to the e¤ort level a, we
can obtain the rst-order condition,
ii F (qi   (a+ d) i)  a = 0.
From the above, the agents optimal e¤ort level is the solution to
a = ii F (qi   (a+ d) i) . (2)
We take the second-order derivative of the agents expected prot:
@2
@a2
iS (a) = i
2
i f (qi   (a+ d) i)  1.
The agents optimal e¤ort level is unique when
i
2
i f (qi   (a+ d) i)  1 < 0.
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The manufacturers problem is formulated as:
max
Ti(x)
M = E (mx  TH(x) j aH ; H) + (1  )E (mx  TL(x) j aL; L)
s:t:
(IR  i) : iS  0,
(LL  i) : i  0,
(IC   i) : ai = ii F (qi   (ai + d) i) ,
(IC  HL) : HS  L + L [(aHL + d) H   qL] F (qL   (aHL + d) H)
+Lf (qL   (aHL + d) H)  1
2
a2HL,
(IC   LH) : LS  H + H [(aLH + d) L   qH ] F (qH   (aLH + d) L)
+Hf (qH   (aLH + d) L)  1
2
a2LH ,
(FC   i) : i  m, (3)
where i = H or L.
The last constraint is the feasibility (FC) constraint which restrains that the
commission rate paid to the agent cannot be larger than the manufacturers prot
margin. As demonstrated by Poblete et al. (2012), the feasibility constraint limits
the commission rate of the contract.
We rst show that given any contract, the high-type agents expected prot
is greater than that of the low-type agent. Di¤erentiating S in (1) with respect
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to  and using the rst-order condition (2), we can nd that
@S
@
= 

@a
@
 + a+ d

F (q   (a+ d) )
+ [(a+ d)    q]

@a
@
 + a+ d

f (q   (a+ d) )
+ [q   (a+ d) ]

@a
@
 + a+ d

f (q   (a+ d) )  a@a
@
= 

@a
@
 + a+ d

F (q   (a+ d) )  a@a
@
=  (a+ d) F (q   (a+ d) ) > 0.
Note that either (LL   L) or (IR   L) must hold as an equality, otherwise
the manufacturer can always decrease the H without violating the incentive
compatibility constraint. When
 1
2
2L
2
L
F 2 (qL   (aL + d) L) + L (qL   Ld) F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L)  0,
the (LL  L) constraint should be binding; when
 1
2
2L
2
L
F 2 (qL   (aL + d) L) + L (qL   Ld) F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L) > 0,
the (IR L) constraint should be binding. We can show that constraints (IR L)
and (IC   HL) should bind at the optimum for the relaxed problem (without
the IC   LH constraint) because otherwise, we can reduce L and H while
making both constraints hold. We can thus solve for L and H from the binding
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constraints (IR  L) and (IC  HL) as
L
=  1
2
2L
2
L
F 2 (qL   (aL + d) L) + L (qL   Ld) F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L) ,
and
H
= L + L [(aHL + d) H   qL] F (qL   (aHL + d) H)
+Lf (qL   (aHL + d) H)  1
2
a2HL
 H [(aH + d) H   qH ] F (qH   (aH + d) H)
 Hf (qH   (aH + d) H) + 1
2
a2H
= L [(aHL + d) H   qL] F (qL   (aHL + d) H)
 1
2
2L
2
L
F 2 (qL   (aL + d) L)
+Lf (qL   (aHL + d) H)  Lf (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Hf (qH   (aH + d) H) + 1
2
a2H  
1
2
a2HL
 H [(aH + d) H   qH ] F (qH   (aH + d) H)
+L (qL   Ld) F (qL   (aL + d) L) .
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Substituting the above into the manufacturers prot function
M =  fm (aH + d) H   H
 H [(aH + d) H   qH ] F (qH   (aH + d) H)
 Hf (qH   (aH + d) H)g
+ (1  ) fm (aL + d) L   L
 L [(aL + d) L   qL] F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L)g ,
we obtain that
M
=  fm (aH + d) H   L
 L [(aHL + d) H   qL] F (qL   (aHL + d) H)
 Lf (qL   (aHL + d) H) + 1
2
a2HL
+H [(aH + d) H   qH ] F (qH   (aH + d) H)
+Hf (qH   (aH + d) H)  1
2
a2H
 H [(aH + d) H   qH ] F (qH   (aH + d) H)
 Hf (qH   (aH + d) H)g
+ (1  ) fm (aL + d) L   L
 L [(aL + d) L   qL] F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L)g
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=  [m (aH + d) H   L
 L [(aHL + d) H   qL] F (qL   (aHL + d) H)
 Lf (qL   (aHL + d) H) + 1
2
a2HL  
1
2
a2H

+ (1  ) fm (aL + d) L   L
 L [(aL + d) L   qL] F (qL   (aL + d) L)
 Lf (qL   (aL + d) L)g .
3.2 Dual-target Contract
The dual-target contract is dened as follows:
T (x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
; x  q1;
 + 1 (x  q1) ; q1 < x  q2;
 + 2 (x  q2) + 1 (q2   q1) ; x > q2.
Notice that the agents expected prot is:
iS (a) = E (T (x) j a; i) 
1
2
a2
=    1
2
a2
+1 [(a+ d) i   q1] (F (q2   (a+ d) i)  F (q1   (a+ d) i))
 1 (f (q2   (a+ d) i)  f (q1   (a+ d) i))
+ f2 [(a+ d) i   q2] + 1 (q2   q1)g (1  F (q2   (a+ d) i))
+2f (q2   (a+ d) i) ,
where i = H or L.
Maximizing the agents expected prot with respect to the e¤ort level a, we
can obtain the rst-order condition,
1i (F (q2   (a+ d) i)  F (q1   (a+ d) i)) + 2i F (q2   (a+ d) i)  a = 0.
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From the above, the agents optimal e¤ort level is the solution to
a = 1i (F (q2   (a+ d) i)  F (q1   (a+ d) i)) + 2i F (q2   (a+ d) i) .
We take the second-order derivative of the agents expected prot with respect
to the agents e¤ort level when the rst-order derivative equals to 0:
@2
@a2
iS (a) = 1
2
i (f (q2   (a+ d) i)  f (q2   (a+ d) i))
+2
2
i f (q2   (a+ d) i)  1.
A su¢ cient condition for the agents optimal e¤ort level to be unique is:
1
2
i (f (q2   (a+ d) i)  f (q2   (a+ d) i))
+2
2
i f (q2   (a+ d) i)  1 < 0.
For convenience, we dene:
H1  q1   (aH + d) H , H2  q2   (aH + d) H ,
L1  q1   (aL + d) L, L2  q2   (aL + d) L.
Thereby, the type-i agents expected prot is as follows:
iS
=    1
2
a2i
+1 [(ai + d) i   q1] (F (i2)  F (i1))  1 (f (i2)  f (i1))
+ f2 [(ai + d) i   q2] + 1 (q2   q1)g F (i2) + 2f (i2) ,
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For the high-type agent,
S H
=    1
2
a2H
+1 [(aH + d) H   q1] (F (H2)  F (H1))  1 (f (H2)  f (H1))
+ f2 [(aH + d) H   q2] + 1 (q2   q1)g F (H2) + 2f (H2) ;
For the low-type agent,
S L
=    1
2
a2L
+1 [(aL + d) L   q1] (F (L2)  F (L1))  1 (f (L2)  f (L1))
+ f2 [(aL + d) L   q2] + 1 (q2   q1)g F (L2) + 2f (L2) .
The manufacturers problem is formulated as:
max
T (x)
M = E (mx  T (x) j aH ; H) + (1  )E (mx  T (x) j aL; L)
s:t:
(IR  i) : iS  0,
(LL  i) : i  0,
(IC   i) : ai = ii F (qi   (ai + d) i) ,
(FC   i) : i  m,
where i = H or L.
Substituting the agents expected prot into the manufacturers expected
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prot,
M =  fmH (aH + d)  
+1H1 (F (H2)  F (H1)) + 1 (f (H2)  f (H1))
 f 2H2 + 1 (q2   q1)g F (H2)  2f (H2)
	
+ (1  ) fmL (aL + d)  
+1L1 (F (L2)  F (L1)) + 1 (f (L2)  f (L1))
 f 2L2 + 1 (q2   q1)g F (L2)  2f (L2)
	
.
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct a numerical analysis to compare the menu of single-
target contracts with the dual-target contract. We x some parameter values,
vary the rest and come out with 98 sets of data: the probability of the high type
 takes the value from 0:2 to 0:8 in increments of 0:1; the value of the high type is
H = 3:0, the value of the low type L takes the value from 1:6 to 2:8 in increments
of 0:2; the basic demand is d = 2; the manufacturers prot margin is m = 2.
For the random market demand noise ", the mean is  = 0 and the standard
deviation is  = 1. For each set of data, we optimize the agents e¤ort level,
and compute the manufacturers expected prots under the menu of single-target
contracts and the dual-target contract, respectively.
In Figure 1, we compare the manufacturers expected prot under the two
contractual forms. Figure 2 shows the ratio of the manufacturers expected prot
under the menu contract to that under the dual-target contract. Figures 1 and
2 indicate that, when the probability of the high type is small (i.e.,  < 0:4), the
performance of the dual-target contract is always below but nearly as good as
that under the menu contract; the di¤erence between the manufacturers expected
prots under these two contractual forms decreases as the low type value gets
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Figure 1: Comparison of the manufacturers prots under the menu of single-
target contracts and the dual-target contract.
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closer to the high type value. For medium values of  (i.e., 0:4    0:7), there
exists a threshold of the low type value. When the low type value is below the
threshold, the dual-target contract outperforms the menu contract; when the low
type value is above the threshold, the dual-target contract underperforms but
is nearly as good as the menu contract. Moreover, the di¤erence between the
manufacturers expected prots under these two contractual forms changes with
a trend similar to the small  scenarios. For large values of  (i.e.,   0:8), again,
there exists a threshold of the low type value. When the low type value is below
the threshold, the dual-target contract can perform much better than the menu
contract in terms of the manufacturers expected prot, and the prot di¤erence
is decreasing as the low type value approaches the high type value. When the
low type value is above the threshold, the dual-target contract is worse than the
menu contract and the performance di¤erence increases with the low type value.
In general, the dual-target contract performs as good as or even better than
the menu contract except for the case when the probability of the high type is
very large and the high and low type values are very close, which can be shown in
Figure 3. In Figure 3, above the curve, the dual-target contract outperforms the
menu of single-target contracts; and below the curve, the menu of single-target
contracts outperforms the dual-target contract.
To explore the di¤erence between the two contractual forms and to explain the
above phenomena, we investigate each one of the three cases (small/medium/high
values of ). We plot the manufacturers expected prot, the expected sales and
the high-type agents expected prot under each case in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7.
The reason why we dont plot the low-type agents expected prot is that the low-
type agents expected prot is always zero for any  value. This result veries
the aforementioned assumption that the low-type agents (IR) constraint should
always be binding.
Recall that in Figure 1, under the cases of  = 0:2 and  = 0:3, the menu con-
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Figure 2: Ratio of the manufacturers prot under the menu of single-target
contracts to that under the dual-target contract.
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Figure 3: The performance of the dual-target contract versus the menu of single-
target contracts.
tract always outperforms the dual-target contract in terms of the manufacturers
expected prot. In Figure 4(b) and Figure 5(b), we nd that the expected sales
of the dual-target contract are greater than that of the menu contract, except for
the case when the low type value L is su¢ ciently close to the high type value H .
Although intuition may indicate that larger sales would result in a larger prot
to the manufacturer, Figure 4(c) and Figure 5(c) show that the manufacturer
has to pay the high-type agent a larger prot under the dual-target contract than
that under the menu contract, and thus gains a lower prot under the dual-target
contract.
In Figure 6, under circumstances in which the probability of the high type
equals to that of the low type ( = 0:5), when the low type value L is much
lower than the high type value H , its in the manufacturers interest to provide
no incentive to the low-type agent and a strong incentive to the high-type under
the dual-target contract. The contract parameters are chosen to ensure that the
high-type agent earns a zero prot, i.e., the high-type agents (IR) constraint is
binding; see Table H in Appendix B. Apparently its wise for the manufacturer to
do so: the performance of the dual-target contract is better than the menu con-
tract in terms of the manufacturers expected prot when the di¤erence between
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Figure 4: Comparison between the menu of single-target contracts and the dual-
target contract for the case of  = 0:2.
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Figure 5: Comparison between the menu of single-target contracts and the dual-
target contract for the case of  = 0:3.
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the values of the two types is large, although this di¤erence decreases with the
low type value. Similar to the case of low values of , a threshold for the low type
value L exists: the relative performance of the two contractual forms reverses
after the low type value L exceeds the threshold, and the exceeding amount of
the manufacturers expected prot under the menu contract over that under the
dual-target contract is decreasing when the low type value L gets closer to the
high type one.
Figure 6: Comparison between the menu of single-target contracts and the dual-
target contract for the case of  = 0:5.
In Figure 7, under circumstances in which the probability of the high type is
much larger than that of the low type ( = 0:8). Again, there exists a threshold:
in terms of the manufacturers expected prot, the dual-target contract performs
much better when the low type value is much lower than the high type one but
the performance di¤erence of the two types of contracts decreases as the low
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type value gets closer to the threshold; and after the low type value exceeds
the threshold, the menu contract outperforms the dual-target contract and the
performance di¤erence increases with the low type value. Under the dual-target
contract, no incentive is provided for the low-type agent and the optimal dual-
target contract is solely designed for the high-type agent. According to Table K,
the dual-target contracts parameters are chosen to make the high-type agents
(IR) constraint binding. As inducing the agents selling e¤ort is costly, and the
expected sales generated by the low-type agent is considerably low relative to her
payment; its better to provide no incentive to the low-type agent when the low
type value is much lower than the high type value.
Unlike the dual-target contract in which it is optimal for the manufacturer to
provide no incentive to the low-type agent, the menu contract always provides
incentive for both types of agent. Furthermore, both the manufacturers expected
prot and the expected sales grow with the decreasing di¤erence between the two
type values. As the menu contract outperforms the dual-target contract after
the low type value exceeds the threshold, it is no longer appropriate to o¤er the
low-type agent zero incentive.
In Figure 8, we plot the expected sales of each type of agent and the corre-
sponding optimal quotas under the menu contract. The dashed lines represent the
quotas set in the contract for each type and the solid lines represent the expected
sales. In general, the optimal quota for each type is set below the expected sales
of that type, and the di¤erence between the expected sales and the sales quotas
increases when the low type value L gets close to the high type value H . When
L is su¢ ciently close to H and the probability of the high type takes small to
medium values (0:2   < 0:7), the optimal quotas of both types are set below
the low-type agents expected sales. As shown in Tables E and F in Appendix B,
both the high-type agents and the low-type agents e¤ort levels are increasing in
the low type value. This corresponds to a situation that when the di¤erence be-
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Figure 7: Comparison between the menu of single-target contracts and the dual-
target contract for the case of  = 0:8.
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Figure 8: Comparison between the sales quota and the expected sales of each
type of agent under the menu of single-target contracts.
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tween the two type values is large, the large di¤erence a¤ects the performance of
the menu contract in terms of the expected sales and the manufacturers expected
prot.
In Figure 9, we plot the optimal commission rate L for the low-type agent
under the menu of single-target contracts. Note that in Figure 9, the optimal
commission rate of the low-type contract under the menu contract displays a
convex pattern that it decreases to a certain extent and increases afterwards,
while the high-type commission rate is set at the maximum value restrained by
the feasibility constraint (3).
In Figure 9(a), the optimal commission rate of the low type contract is set at
the maximum value 2 when L = 1:6,  = 0:2. Recall that in Figure 8(a) (also
see Table L in Appendix C), the expected sales are 0.25 below the low quota
in this scenario, which means that its quite possible (> 50%) that the low-type
agent will not receive commission part of the payment. So its optimal for the
manufacturer to combine a high commission and a high quota in designing the
low-type contract to provide an incentive strong enough for the low-type agent.
Recall that in Figures 4 and 5, the high-type agents expected prot displays
a concave pattern in which it increases with the low type value until the low type
value meets a threshold and decreases afterwards. The reason that the high-type
agents expected prot changes in the opposite way against that of the optimal
low-type commission rate could be explained as follows: since the base salary
for the low-type agent increases as the low type value increases (see Table A in
Appendix A), its in the manufacturers interest to lower the commission rate to
make the low-type agents (IR) constraint binding. As the base salary of the low-
type contract increases, the base salary of the high-type contract increases corre-
spondingly. The high-type commission rate which is set at the maximum value
boosts the high-type agents expected prot before the low type value reaches
the threshold. However, when the low type value exceeds the threshold, it is no
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Figure 9: The optimal commission rate L for the low-type agent under the menu
of single-target contracts.
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longer capable for the manufacturer to provide an incentive strong enough for
the low-type agent (although the (IR L) constraint is still binding) by only en-
larging the low-type commission rate. Thereby, the manufacturer has to jointly
increase the commission rate and the base salary of the low-type contract after the
low-type value surpasses the threshold. This consideration of the manufacturer
explains the concavity of the high-type agents expected prot.
The above corresponds to a situation in which the probability of the high type
 takes low values (0:2    0:4). The optimal base salaries of the high-type
contract and the low-type contract are very close when the low type value L is
either much lower than or very close to the high type value H (see Table A in
Appendix A). However, when the low type value L takes medium values (e.g.,
L = 2:2), the base salary of the high-type contract is much higher than that
of the low-type contract, compared to the cases when the low type takes either
very small or very large value. This indicates that when L takes medium values,
the high-type agent has a motivation to imitate the low-type agent and choose
a low-type contract. In order to prevent this from happening, the manufacturer
has to give the high-type agent a higher premium. Thus, the high-type agent can
gain a higher prot.
Finally, in Figure 10, we plot the expected sales of each type of agent and
the corresponding optimal quotas under the dual-target contract. The dashed
lines represent the two quotas set in the contract and the solid lines represent the
expected sales. Note that the optimal quotas under the dual-target contract are in
the following way: when the probability of the high-type  is small (i.e.,  < 0:4),
the quotas are set such that the high-type agents expected sales are between the
low quota and the high quota but close to the high one; when  takes medium
to high values (i.e., 0:5   < 0:8), there exists a threshold for the low type
value. When the di¤erence between the two type values is large, the dual-target
contract is solely designed for the high-type agent while providing no incentive
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to the low-type agent. Thereby, the optimal quota changes in a similar way with
that of the high-type agents expected sales. After the low type value exceeds
the threshold, the manufacturer has to provide the low-type agent an incentive.
Whenever the low-type agents selling e¤ort is induced, the low quota should be
set below the low-type agents expected sales within a 3 range and far below the
high quota. Hence, it is important to notice that although the high-type agents
expected sales are below the high quota q2, the below part is no larger than 1.
This indicates that there stands a good probability (> 30%) for the high-type
agent to reach, or even exceed q2. When  takes high values (i.e.,   0:8), the
optimal dual-target contract solely provides incentive to the high-type agent, the
high-type agents expected sales are always between the low quota and the high
quota but within a 3 range of the high one. The low quota is set far below the
high one. In extant publications, contract settings which consider deterministic
sales outcome with varying type always come to the conclusion that the sales
quota should be set exactly at the expected sales. In contrast, our result shows
that due to the randomness in the sales outcome, setting the sales quota above the
expected sales is possible. If the sales quota is set much higher than the expected
sales, the agent will perceive it as unapproachable. However, it is possible for the
agent to meet or exceed the sales quota under the optimal dual-target contract,
although the sales quota is set closely above the expected sales.
In Figure 11, we plot the optimal commission rate 1 for sales between the
low and high quotas under the dual-target contract. The commission rate for
sales above the high quota 2 is set at the maximum value, and that for sales
between the low and high quotas is smaller than the maximum value.
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Figure 10: Comparison between the sales quotas and the expected sales of each
type of agent under the dual-target contract.
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Figure 11: The optimal commission rate 1 for the low-type agent under the
dual-target contract.
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5 Future Work
We can consider the model setting in which the realized sales consists of a deter-
ministic part and a random part. The deterministic part is determined by the
agents type and her e¤ort level in a multiplicative demande¤ort relationship.
Note that the multiplicative demande¤ort relationship has been used by a num-
ber of publications in the literature such as Rao 1990, Petruzzi and Dada 1999,
Agrawal and Seshadri 2000, Chen 2000, Chen 2005, Chen and Xiao 2009, and
Chu and Lai 2013. For our future work, we can investigate the case of additive
demande¤ort relationship and nd out if our major ndings and insights based
on the multiplicative demande¤ort relationship can still hold.
In addition, we assume that the randomness in the realized sales follows a
normal distribution. We can test the robustness of our major results by modeling
the randomness with other distributions that have been used in the literature,
including the gamma, compound Poisson, or uniform distribution.
6 Conclusion
In this thesis, we considered the problem where a manufacturer sells a product
through his agent who has private information about her selling e¤ort and the
type, i.e., a problem involving both moral hazard and adverse selection. To
explore the design of salesforce compensation schemes, we considered two types
of contract: the multi-target contracts that are widely observed in practice and
the menu of contracts that are commonly considered in the literature to address
the adverse selection problem. For the adverse selection problem, we assumed
the agent can be one of two types. We formulated the manufacturers problem
for the optimal contract parameters under a menu of single-target contracts and
for those under a dual-target contract. Then, for each contract, we conducted
an extensive numerical analysis to nd out the optimal contract parameters, the
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optimal e¤ort level and the maximum expected prot of each type of agent, and
the manufacturers optimal expected prot.
We compared the performances of the two contracts in terms of their e¤ec-
tiveness in generating a prot for the manufacturer, and our results generated a
number of managerial implications about the manufacturers optimal choice of
a contract type. In general, neither contract strictly dominates over the other,
the circumstances at which the conclusion can be drawn need to be specied. To
be specic, the relative performance of the menu of single-target contracts and
the dual-target contract is dependent on the probability of the high type and the
di¤erence between the low and high type values.
When the probability of the high type is low, the menu of single-target con-
tracts outperforms the dual-target contract, but the dual-target contract is nearly
as good as the menu contract.
When the probabilities of the high and low types are close, there exists a
threshold for the low type value. If the low type value is below the threshold
(i.e., the low type value is much lower compared with the high type value), the
manufacturer will be better o¤ from adopting the dual-target contract. This
situation corresponds to a large uncertainty about the agent type. In this situ-
ation, the dual-target contract provides no incentive to the low-type agent. On
the other hand, if the low type value is above the threshold, the agent type is
less uncertain, the menu contract is preferred, but again the dual-target contract
is nearly as good as the menu contract. Moreover, if the manufacturer adopts
the dual-target contract, the contract should provide incentives to both types of
agent.
When the probability of the high type is signicantly larger than that of the
low one, there exists a similar threshold for the low type value. The manufac-
turer will receive a larger revenue by applying the dual-target contract. In this
situation, the dual-target contract provides no incentive to the low-type agent,
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even if the low type value is close to the high one. In the meantime, if the low
type value exceeds the threshold, the menu contract outperforms the dual-target
contract, and the surpassing amount of the manufacturers expected prot under
the menu contract over that under the dual-target contract is increasing.
Recall the rst research question raised at the beginning of this thesis: How
is the performance of the widely applied multi-target contract compared with
the well-studied menu contract? We came to the conclusion that in general, the
dual-target contract performs as good as or even better than the menu contract
except for the scenario in which the probability of the high type is very large and
the high/low type values are very close.
After going through the question which contract should be adopted, we ex-
plore the designing issue of the menu contract and the dual-target contract. The
optimal low-type commission rate in the menu of single-target contracts displays
a convex pattern. It decreases to a certain extent and increases afterwards with
the optimal high-type commission rate set at the maximum value restrained by
the feasibility constraint. This pattern indicates the manufacturers joint con-
sideration to make the low-type agents individual rationality constraint binding
and to share the least prot with the high-type agent. By jointly adjusting the
base salary and the commission rate, the manufacturers able to seize the max-
imum prot from the realized sales. For the menu of single-target contracts, in
general, the quota for each type is set above the expected sales of that type, but
the di¤erence increases with the low type value, rendering that each type of agent
only gets more than a half probability to reach or even surpass the quota.
For the dual-target contract, the commission rate for sales above the high
quota is set at the maximum value, and that for sales between the low and high
quotas is smaller than the maximum value. The quotas are set such that the
expected sales of the high-type agent are above the low quota and closely below
the high quota. When the low-type agent is induced an e¤ort, her expected sales
42
are above and close to the low quota. This indicates that whenever the low-type
agent is retained in the game, she has a great probability to receive not only
the base salary, but a small commission. In contrast to extant publications which
considers deterministic sales outcome with respect to the varying type, our results
indicate that setting sales quota above the expected sales is possible.
43
Appendices
A The Optimal Contract Parameters
A.1 Menu of Single-target Contracts
Table A: The optimal contract parameters of the menu of single-target contracts
in the cases of =0.2 to 0.5.
Low Type High Type
 L L L qL H H qH
1.6 1.21 2.00 6.35 3.54 2.00 13.48
1.8 2.55 2.00 8.13 5.88 2.00 14.62
2.0 3.40 1.91 9.61 7.91 2.00 15.77
0.2 2.2 4.22 1.86 11.17 10.36 2.00 16.93
2.4 5.31 1.88 13.04 11.42 2.00 18.09
2.6 6.52 1.93 15.09 12.20 2.00 19.25
2.8 8.07 2.00 17.48 10.82 2.00 19.60
1.6 1.21 2.00 6.35 3.54 2.00 13.48
1.8 2.18 1.91 7.85 5.51 2.00 14.62
2.0 2.63 1.74 9.01 8.41 2.00 15.77
0.3 2.2 3.81 1.77 10.85 10.03 2.00 16.93
2.4 4.83 1.80 12.67 11.16 2.00 18.09
2.6 6.22 1.88 14.87 12.10 2.00 19.25
2.8 7.71 1.95 17.21 10.78 2.00 19.60
1.6 1.16 1.99 6.31 3.50 2.00 13.48
1.8 1.46 1.73 7.25 4.80 2.00 14.62
2.0 1.99 1.60 8.46 7.71 2.00 15.77
0.4 2.2 2.71 1.55 9.91 8.57 2.00 16.93
2.4 4.25 1.69 12.19 10.84 2.00 18.09
2.6 5.75 1.81 14.49 11.95 2.00 19.25
2.8 7.68 1.95 17.18 12.61 2.00 20.42
1.6 0.86 1.87 6.03 3.20 2.00 13.48
1.8 1.05 2.00 7.05 5.70 2.00 14.62
2.0 1.32 1.44 7.80 6.92 2.00 15.77
0.5 2.2 2.25 1.46 9.49 8.74 2.00 16.93
2.4 3.53 1.56 11.55 10.42 2.00 18.09
2.6 5.16 1.71 14.00 11.75 2.00 19.25
2.8 6.87 1.84 16.55 10.68 2.00 19.60
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Table B: The optimal contract parameters of the menu of single-target contracts
in the cases of =0.6 to 0.8.
Low Type High Type
 L L L qL H H qH
1.6 0.61 1.76 5.77 2.97 2.00 13.48
1.8 0.80 1.53 6.58 4.14 2.00 14.62
2.0 1.07 1.37 7.52 5.58 2.00 15.77
0.6 2.2 1.39 1.27 8.57 7.26 2.00 16.93
2.4 2.60 1.37 10.66 9.85 2.00 18.09
2.6 4.38 1.58 13.31 11.48 2.00 19.25
2.8 6.76 1.83 16.46 10.67 2.00 19.60
1.6 0.44 1.67 5.57 2.83 2.00 13.48
1.8 0.50 1.40 6.19 3.85 2.00 14.62
2.0 0.63 1.23 6.95 5.14 2.00 15.77
0.7 2.2 0.79 1.11 7.79 6.66 2.00 16.93
2.4 1.53 1.15 9.44 9.11 2.00 18.09
2.6 3.33 1.39 12.29 11.09 2.00 19.25
2.8 5.95 1.71 15.78 11.01 2.00 19.82
1.6 0.33 1.60 5.41 2.75 2.00 13.48
1.8 0.29 1.29 5.88 3.68 2.00 14.62
2.0 0.32 1.09 6.44 4.85 2.00 15.77
0.8 2.2 0.37 0.96 7.07 6.25 2.00 16.93
2.4 0.65 0.92 8.16 8.40 2.00 18.09
2.6 1.60 1.04 10.27 10.34 2.00 19.25
2.8 1.94 1.01 11.49 11.10 2.00 20.20
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A.2 Dual-target Contract
Table C: The optimal contract parameters of the dual-target contract under the
case from =0.2 to 0.5.
Low Type High Type
 L  1 q1 2 q2
1.6 0.00 1.40 5.01 2.00 20.62
1.8 0.00 1.44 5.94 2.00 20.89
2.0 0.00 1.55 7.10 2.00 21.60
0.2 2.2 1.00 1.66 9.02 2.00 22.40
2.4 2.60 1.76 11.35 2.00 23.15
2.6 4.48 1.85 13.88 2.00 23.88
2.8 5.65 1.93 16.10 2.00 24.72
1.6 0.00 1.28 4.87 2.00 19.80
1.8 0.00 1.29 5.70 2.00 19.83
2.0 0.00 1.40 6.79 2.00 20.53
0.3 2.2 0.92 1.53 8.71 2.00 21.47
2.4 2.51 1.66 11.09 2.00 22.41
2.6 4.53 1.78 13.77 2.00 23.36
2.8 6.68 1.90 16.56 2.00 24.40
1.6 0.00 1.96 14.80 2.00 27.00
1.8 0.00 1.18 5.52 2.00 19.04
2.0 0.00 1.28 6.55 2.00 19.68
0.4 2.2 0.83 1.42 8.43 2.00 20.67
2.4 2.35 1.57 10.82 2.00 21.74
2.6 4.43 1.72 13.59 2.00 22.86
2.8 6.93 1.87 16.63 2.00 24.11
1.6 0.00 1.96 14.80 2.00 27.00
1.8 0.00 1.96 14.80 2.00 27.00
2.0 0.00 1.97 14.86 2.00 27.00
0.5 2.2 0.77 1.32 8.18 2.00 19.99
2.4 2.20 1.49 10.56 2.00 21.13
2.6 4.30 1.66 13.39 2.00 22.38
2.8 7.04 1.83 16.63 2.00 23.83
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Table D: The optimal contract parameters of the dual-target contract under the
case from =0.6 to 0.8.
Low Type High Type
 L  1 q1 2 q2
1.6 0.00 1.31 11.32 2.00 19.73
1.8 0.00 1.57 13.08 2.00 27.00
2.0 0.00 1.95 14.75 2.00 27.00
0.6 2.2 0.00 1.96 14.80 2.00 27.00
2.4 0.00 1.96 14.79 2.00 27.00
2.6 4.15 1.59 13.19 2.00 21.93
2.8 7.12 1.80 16.61 2.00 23.56
1.6 0.00 1.32 11.32 2.00 19.81
1.8 0.00 1.57 13.08 2.00 26.77
2.0 0.00 1.95 14.77 2.00 27.00
0.7 2.2 0.00 1.95 14.77 2.00 27.00
2.4 0.00 1.95 14.78 2.00 27.00
2.6 4.01 1.54 13.01 2.00 21.49
2.8 7.19 1.76 16.59 2.00 23.27
1.6 0.00 1.95 14.79 2.00 27.00
1.8 0.00 1.96 14.79 2.00 27.00
2.0 0.00 1.96 14.82 2.00 27.00
0.8 2.2 0.00 1.95 14.77 2.00 27.00
2.4 0.00 1.95 14.78 2.00 27.00
2.6 4.15 1.95 14.75 2.00 27.00
2.8 7.12 1.91 14.60 2.00 26.56
47
B Performance Comparison between the Menu
of Single-target Contracts and the Dual-target
Contract
Table E: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.2.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 2.37 2.41 11.02 0.00 2.90 13.41
1.8 3.17 2.85 14.27 0.00 2.55 15.37
Menu of 2.0 3.49 3.30 16.88 0.00 3.40 17.07
Single-target 2.2 3.99 3.75 20.02 0.00 4.49 19.31
Contracts 2.4 4.49 4.20 23.39 0.00 4.02 21.73
2.6 5.00 4.67 27.03 0.00 3.07 24.33
2.8 5.60 6.00 33.68 0.00 1.61 27.18
1.6 2.11 4.65 17.31 0.00 10.19 12.52
1.8 2.57 4.72 18.79 0.00 9.46 14.46
Dual-target 2.0 3.09 4.94 21.01 0.00 9.10 16.54
Contract 2.2 3.65 5.19 23.61 0.00 8.42 18.81
2.4 4.23 5.42 26.42 0.00 7.17 21.30
2.6 4.82 5.63 29.42 0.00 5.34 24.00
2.8 5.41 5.82 32.61 0.00 2.94 26.90
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Table F: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.3.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 2.37 2.41 11.02 0.00 1.21 14.53
1.8 2.96 2.85 13.88 0.00 2.18 16.29
Menu of 2.0 3.19 3.30 16.27 0.00 3.90 17.70
Single-target 2.2 3.79 3.75 19.58 0.00 4.16 19.80
Contracts 2.4 4.28 4.20 22.88 0.00 3.76 22.08
2.6 4.88 4.67 26.72 0.00 2.97 24.55
2.8 5.47 6.00 33.31 0.00 1.57 27.34
1.6 1.84 4.37 16.06 0.00 8.78 13.39
1.8 2.27 4.37 17.18 0.00 7.85 15.20
Dual-target 2.0 2.79 4.58 19.32 0.00 7.67 17.08
Contract 2.2 3.36 4.88 22.05 0.00 7.34 19.17
2.4 3.99 5.18 25.10 0.00 6.48 21.51
2.6 4.64 5.46 28.44 0.00 5.01 24.09
2.8 5.32 5.73 32.08 0.00 2.86 26.92
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Table G: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.4.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 2.34 2.41 11.02 0.00 1.17 15.64
1.8 2.50 2.85 13.88 0.00 1.56 17.28
Menu of 2.0 2.81 3.30 16.27 0.00 3.21 18.43
Single-target 2.2 3.21 3.75 19.58 0.00 2.71 20.57
Contracts 2.4 4.01 4.20 22.88 0.00 3.43 22.47
2.6 4.69 4.67 26.72 0.00 2.82 24.79
2.8 5.46 5.17 33.31 0.00 1.57 27.36
1.6 0.00 5.87 10.97 0.00 0.01 15.83
1.8 2.03 4.10 13.06 0.00 6.74 16.05
Dual-target 2.0 2.54 4.30 15.51 0.00 6.59 17.74
Contract 2.2 3.12 4.62 18.31 0.00 6.47 19.62
2.4 3.76 4.95 22.23 0.00 5.89 21.78
2.6 4.47 5.30 26.22 0.00 4.70 24.21
2.8 5.22 5.65 30.78 0.00 2.77 26.95
Table H: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.5.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 2.09 2.41 10.57 0.00 0.87 16.79
1.8 1.99 2.85 12.15 0.00 2.37 17.53
Menu of 2.0 2.35 3.30 14.60 0.00 2.41 19.29
Single-target 2.2 2.95 3.75 17.73 0.00 2.87 21.01
Contracts 2.4 3.65 4.20 21.37 0.00 3.01 22.92
2.6 4.43 4.67 25.55 0.00 2.62 25.06
2.8 5.15 6.00 32.43 0.00 1.47 27.65
1.6 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.01 18.19
1.8 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.02 18.59
Dual-target 2.0 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.02 18.99
Contract 2.2 2.90 4.39 19.55 0.00 5.75 20.15
2.4 3.55 4.75 22.79 0.00 5.37 22.10
2.6 4.30 5.14 26.60 0.00 3.88 24.37
2.8 5.13 5.56 31.03 0.00 2.69 26.99
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Table I: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.6.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 1.86 2.41 10.20 0.00 0.64 18.00
1.8 1.98 2.85 12.12 0.00 0.81 19.49
Menu of 2.0 2.16 3.30 14.21 0.00 1.07 20.89
Single-target 2.2 2.37 3.75 16.47 0.00 1.39 22.21
Contracts 2.4 3.14 4.20 20.15 0.00 2.44 23.47
2.6 4.08 4.67 24.62 0.00 2.35 25.38
2.8 5.11 6.00 32.31 0.00 1.46 27.83
1.6 0.00 4.02 12.07 0.00 0.75 18.94
1.8 0.00 4.72 14.16 0.00 0.00 20.39
Dual-target 2.0 0.00 5.84 17.51 0.00 0.01 21.19
Contract 2.2 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.01 21.51
2.4 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.01 22.48
2.6 4.13 4.99 25.73 0.00 4.14 24.55
2.8 5.03 5.47 30.50 0.00 2.60 27.04
Table J: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.7.
L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 1.69 2.41 9.92 0.00 0.50 19.25
1.8 1.67 2.85 11.57 0.00 0.52 20.72
Menu of 2.0 1.76 3.30 13.41 0.00 0.63 22.05
Single-target 2.2 1.88 3.75 15.38 0.00 0.79 23.26
Contracts 2.4 2.45 4.20 18.48 0.00 1.70 24.19
2.6 3.55 4.67 23.24 0.00 1.96 25.78
2.8 4.78 6.00 31.40 0.00 1.36 28.01
1.6 0.00 4.06 12.18 0.00 0.81 21.03
1.8 0.00 4.72 14.16 0.00 0.41 22.59
Dual-target 2.0 0.00 5.85 17.56 0.00 0.01 23.39
Contract 2.2 0.00 5.85 17.56 0.00 0.04 23.63
2.4 0.00 5.85 17.56 0.00 0.01 23.87
2.6 3.97 4.85 24.87 0.00 3.88 24.77
2.8 4.93 5.39 29.95 0.00 2.52 27.10
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Table K: Comparison of the performance between the menu of single-target con-
tracts and the dual-target contract under the case of =0.8.
D L aL aH Expected Sales LS 
H
S M
1.6 1.55 2.41 9.70 0.00 0.42 20.53
1.8 1.43 2.85 11.13 0.00 0.35 22.02
Menu of 2.0 1.40 3.30 12.69 0.00 0.34 23.33
Single-target 2.2 1.42 3.75 14.37 0.00 0.38 24.48
Contracts 2.4 1.70 4.20 16.70 0.00 1.00 25.18
2.6 2.48 4.67 20.47 0.00 1.21 26.37
2.8 2.71 6.00 25.58 0.00 0.71 27.97
1.6 0.00 5.86 17.59 0.00 0.01 25.26
1.8 0.00 5.87 17.60 0.00 0.02 25.42
Dual-target 2.0 0.00 5.88 17.65 0.00 0.01 25.58
Contract 2.2 0.00 5.85 17.55 0.00 0.01 25.74
2.4 0.00 5.86 17.57 0.00 0.01 25.90
2.6 0.00 5.84 17.51 0.00 0.01 26.06
2.8 0.00 5.74 17.22 0.00 0.01 26.20
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C The Di¤erence between Expected Sales and
Sales Quotas
C.1 Menu of Single-target Contracts
Table L: Comparison between the sales quota and the expected sales of each type
of agent under the menu of single-target contracts in the cases of =0.2 to 0.5.
L qH qL SH   qH SL   qL
1.6 13.48 6.35 -0.25 0.65
1.8 14.62 8.13 -0.06 1.18
2 15.77 9.61 0.12 1.38
 = 0:2 2.2 16.93 11.17 0.32 2.01
2.4 18.09 13.04 0.53 2.53
2.6 19.25 15.09 0.77 3.11
2.8 19.60 17.48 4.40 3.80
1.6 13.48 6.35 -0.25 0.65
1.8 14.62 7.85 -0.06 1.08
2 15.77 9.01 0.12 1.36
 = 0:3 2.2 16.93 10.85 0.32 1.89
2.4 18.09 12.67 0.53 2.40
2.6 19.25 14.87 0.77 3.03
2.8 19.60 17.21 4.40 3.71
1.6 13.48 6.31 -0.25 0.63
1.8 14.62 7.25 -0.06 0.85
2 15.77 8.46 0.12 1.16
 = 0:4 2.2 16.93 9.91 0.32 1.55
2.4 18.09 12.19 0.53 2.23
2.6 19.25 14.49 0.77 2.90
2.8 20.42 17.18 1.09 3.70
1.6 13.48 6.03 -0.25 0.52
1.8 14.62 7.05 -0.06 0.14
2 15.77 7.80 0.12 0.90
 = 0:5 2.2 16.93 9.49 0.32 1.39
2.4 18.09 11.55 0.53 2.00
2.6 19.25 14.00 0.77 2.73
2.8 19.60 16.55 4.40 3.48
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Table M: Comparison between the sales quota and the expected sales of each type
of agent under the menu of single-target contracts in the cases of =0.6 to 0.8.
L qH qL SH   qH SL   qL
1.6 13.48 5.77 -0.25 0.41
1.8 14.62 6.58 -0.06 0.58
2 15.77 7.52 0.12 0.80
 = 0:6 2.2 16.93 8.57 0.32 1.05
2.4 18.09 10.66 0.53 1.68
2.6 19.25 13.31 0.77 2.49
2.8 19.60 16.46 4.40 3.45
1.6 13.48 5.57 -0.25 0.33
1.8 14.62 6.19 -0.06 0.42
2 15.77 6.95 0.12 0.57
 = 0:7 2.2 16.93 7.79 0.32 0.74
2.4 18.09 9.44 0.53 1.23
2.6 19.25 12.29 0.77 2.13
2.8 19.82 15.78 4.18 3.22
1.6 13.48 5.41 -0.25 0.26
1.8 14.62 5.88 -0.06 0.29
2 15.77 6.44 0.12 0.36
 = 0:8 2.2 16.93 7.07 0.32 0.45
2.4 18.09 8.16 0.53 0.73
2.6 19.25 10.27 0.77 1.38
2.8 20.20 11.49 3.80 1.69
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C.2 Dual-target Contract
Table N: Comparison between the sales quotas and the expected sales of each
type of agent under the dual-target contract in the cases of =0.2 to 0.5.
L q1 q2 SH   q1 SH   q2 SL   q1 SL   q2
1.6 5.01 20.62 14.93 -0.68 1.56 -14.05
1.8 5.94 20.89 14.23 -0.72 2.28 -12.67
2 7.10 21.60 13.72 -0.78 3.09 -11.41
 = 0:2 2.2 9.02 22.40 12.55 -0.83 3.42 -9.96
2.4 11.35 23.15 10.91 -0.88 3.60 -8.20
2.6 13.88 23.88 9.01 -0.99 3.84 -6.15
2.8 16.10 24.72 7.36 -1.26 4.65 -3.96
1.6 4.87 19.80 14.25 -0.68 1.28 -13.66
1.8 5.70 19.83 13.41 -0.73 1.98 -12.15
2 6.79 20.53 12.96 -0.78 2.78 -10.96
 = 0:3 2.2 8.71 21.47 11.94 -0.82 3.09 -9.67
2.4 11.09 22.41 10.44 -0.88 3.27 -8.04
2.6 13.77 23.36 8.61 -0.97 3.49 -6.09
2.8 16.56 24.40 6.63 -1.20 3.93 -3.91
1.6 14.80 27.00 8.81 -3.40 -11.60 -23.80
1.8 5.52 19.04 12.79 -0.73 1.73 -11.79
2 6.55 19.68 12.34 -0.78 2.52 -10.61
 = 0:4 2.2 8.43 20.67 11.43 -0.82 2.83 -9.42
2.4 10.82 21.74 10.05 -0.87 3.01 -7.91
2.6 13.59 22.86 8.30 -0.96 3.22 -6.05
2.8 16.63 24.11 6.31 -1.18 3.60 -3.89
1.6 14.80 27.00 8.81 -3.40 -11.60 -23.80
1.8 14.80 27.00 8.81 -3.40 -11.20 -23.40
2 14.86 27.00 8.75 -3.40 -10.86 -23.00
 = 0:5 2.2 8.18 19.99 10.98 -0.82 2.59 -9.21
2.4 10.56 21.13 9.70 -0.87 2.78 -7.80
2.6 13.39 22.38 8.04 -0.95 2.98 -6.01
2.8 16.63 23.83 6.05 -1.16 3.33 -3.88
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Table O: Comparison between the sales quotas and the expected sales of each
type of agent under the dual-target contract in the cases of =0.6 to 0.8.
L q1 q2 SH   q1 SH   q2 SL   q1 SL   q2
1.6 11.32 19.73 6.75 -1.66 -8.12 -16.53
1.8 13.08 27.00 7.08 -6.84 -9.48 -23.40
2 14.75 27.00 8.76 -3.49 -10.75 -23.00
 = 0:6 2.2 14.80 27.00 8.81 -3.40 -10.40 -22.60
2.4 14.79 27.00 8.81 -3.40 -9.99 -22.20
2.6 13.19 21.93 7.79 -0.95 2.75 -5.98
2.8 16.61 23.56 5.81 -1.14 3.08 -3.87
1.6 11.32 19.81 6.86 -1.63 -8.12 -16.61
1.8 13.08 26.77 7.08 -6.61 -9.48 -23.17
2 14.77 27.00 8.79 -3.44 -10.77 -23.00
 = 0:7 2.2 14.77 27.00 8.79 -3.44 -10.37 -22.60
2.4 14.78 27.00 8.79 -3.44 -9.98 -22.20
2.6 13.01 21.49 7.54 -0.94 2.52 -5.97
2.8 16.59 23.27 5.56 -1.12 2.80 -3.88
1.6 14.79 27.00 8.80 -3.41 -11.59 -23.80
1.8 14.79 27.00 8.80 -3.40 -11.19 -23.40
2 14.82 27.00 8.83 -3.35 -10.82 -23.00
 = 0:8 2.2 14.77 27.00 8.78 -3.45 -10.37 -22.60
2.4 14.78 27.00 8.79 -3.43 -9.98 -22.20
2.6 14.75 27.00 8.76 -3.49 -9.55 -21.80
2.8 14.60 26.56 8.62 -3.34 -9.00 -20.96
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